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Abstract 
This study investigates the pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area on the basis of surveys 
conducted by nine Eurosystem national central banks. Overall, more than 11,000 firms 
participated in the survey. The results are very robust across countries. Firms operate in 
monopolistically competitive markets, where prices are mostly set following mark-up rules 
and where price discrimination is a common practice. Our evidence suggests that both time- 
and state-dependent pricing strategies are applied by firms in the euro area: around one-third 
of the companies follow mainly time-dependent pricing rules while two-thirds use pricing rules 
with some element of state-dependence. Although the majority of firms take into account a 
wide range of information, including past and expected economic developments, about 
one-third adopts a purely backward-looking behaviour. The pattern of results lends support to 
the recent wave of estimations of hybrid versions of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Price 
stickiness arises both at the stage when firms review their prices and again when they actually 
change prices. The most relevant factors underlying price rigidity are customer relationships– 
as expressed in the theories about explicit and implicit contracts –and thus, are mainly found 
at the price changing (second) stage of the price adjustment process. Finally, we provide 
evidence that firms adjust prices asymmetrically in response to shocks, depending on the 
direction of the adjustment and the source of the shock: while cost shocks have a greater 
impact when prices have to be raised than when they have to be reduced, reductions in 
demand are more likely to induce a price change than increases in demand. 
JEL codes: E30, D40. 
 
Keywords: price setting, nominal rigidity, real rigidity, inflation persistence, survey 
data. 
  
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, a substantial amount of theoretical research devoted to improving 
the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic behaviour has shown that the nature of 
nominal rigidities plays a key role in determining the effects of different shocks on the 
economy. This theoretical research has made clear that a thorough understanding of the 
extent and causes of the sluggish adjustment of nominal prices is crucial to the design 
and conduct of monetary policy. In this respect, empirical work aimed at an improved 
characterisation of the price-setting behaviour of firms is of major interest for monetary 
policy making. The objective of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the behavioural 
mechanisms underlying price setting by using a methodological approach –asking firms 
directly about how they set prices– that is particularly well-suited for the purpose at hand. 
Although the increasing availability of quantitative consumer and producer price micro 
databases has recently provided detailed descriptions of the periodicity and magnitude of 
price changes in a number of economies1, these quantitative characterisations of price 
dynamics are not enough to understand the underlying rationale of the behaviour of 
price setters. There are certain aspects of firms’ pricing polices that can only be investigated 
on the basis of the qualitative information obtained from surveys. In particular, firms’ 
responses can provide valuable insights into the relative importance of nominal versus real 
rigidities or the type of information set used in the revision of prices. Furthermore, the use of 
survey results allows us to investigate separately the two stages of the price adjustment 
process (i.e. the review stage and the implementation stage), to empirically assess 
alternative theories on price stickiness and to test whether the response of prices to shocks 
differs depending on the nature (costs/demand) or the sign of the disturbances. Finally, 
survey results are also useful in cross checking the evidence obtained from quantitative 
databases. 
The use of surveys to explore the price setting behaviour of firms was pioneered by the 
seminal work of Blinder (1991 and 1994) and Blinder et al. (1998) for the United States.2 This 
work has led to the conduct of similar surveys in other countries: Köhler (1996) in Germany, 
Hall et al. (1997 and 2000) in the United Kingdom, Apel et al. (2005) in Sweden and 
Amirault et al. (2004) in Canada. 
Within this line of research, this paper provides an in-depth study of firms’ price-setting 
mechanism in the euro area on the basis of the evidence obtained from surveys conducted 
in 2003 and 2004 in nine euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), covering 94% of euro area GDP.3 The 
national surveys were designed following a decentralised approach.4 The surveys were 
conducted either by phone, internet or post; a small number took the form of face-to-face 
interviews.5 The number of respondents in each country ranged from 333 to 2,008. 
All together, more than 11,000 companies in the euro area were surveyed. The sectoral 
coverage was limited to manufacturing in some countries, while in others pricing behaviour 
in construction, trade and services was also investigated (see Table B.1 in Appendix B for 
the sectoral coverage). There is some over-representation of the industrial sector in most 
                                                
1  See Bils and Klenow (2004) and Dyhne et al. (2005). 
2  For a very early example of this kind of work, see Hall and Hitch (1939). 
3  The detailed results for each country can be found in the country-specific studies conducted in the framework 
of the IPN: Kwapil et al. (2005) for Austria (AT), Aucremanne and Druant (2005) for Belgium (BE), Loupias 
and Ricart (2004) for France (FR), Stahl (2005) for Germany (DE), Fabiani et al. (2004) for Italy (IT), 
Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) for Luxembourg (LU), Hoeberichts and Stokman (2005) for the Netherlands 
(NL), Martins (2005) for Portugal (PT), and Álvarez and Hernando (2005) for Spain (ES). These works can be 
withdrawn from the ECB website. 
4  See Appendix A and the national studies mentioned in footnote 3 for a detailed description of the main 
characteristics of the national surveys. 
5  The contact in each responding firm was in most cases one of the senior managers. 
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 of the national samples, which explains why the majority of companies (75% on average) sell 
their main product predominantly to other firms.6 Thus, the conclusions we draw are mainly 
related to producer prices rather than to consumer prices. 
The national surveys display a sufficiently high degree of comparability across 
countries, despite the adoption of a decentralised approach in their design.7 Thus, a number 
of common characteristics can be observed in the full set of results from all of the countries. 
The country coverage and the high comparability of the national surveys imply that these 
common features may be regarded as stylised facts underlying the price-setting mechanism 
in the euro area. 
It is worth emphasising that these important common patterns do not appear to depend 
on the way the national surveys were conducted, the number of questions asked, the precise 
wording and order of the questions and the options within a particular question. The results 
are therefore characterised by a high degree of robustness that is further strengthened by 
the fact that the nine national surveys were carried out under different business cycle 
conditions.8 
The structure of the paper follows the different stages of the price setting process. 
Section 2 deals with the price reviewing stage and provides evidence on the time- or state- 
dependent nature of firms’ pricing policies, the information set used and the frequency of 
price reviews. Section 3 investigates how firms set prices, documents the frequency of price 
changes and explores the empirical support of alternative theories on price stickiness. The 
responses on the factors underlying price setting are analysed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Price reviews 
This section documents the main features of the first step of the price adjustment 
process, the one in which firms evaluate the price they want to set, taking into account the 
information they have and checking whether it coincides with the price they currently charge. 
2.1 Time-dependent versus state-dependent pricing rules 
Individual firms do not continuously adjust their prices in response to all the relevant 
shocks in the economy. To model this fact, the theoretical literature considers mainly 
two types of pricing behaviour: time-dependent pricing rules and state-dependent 
ones. According to the former, either with a deterministic [Taylor (1980)] or a stochastic 
[Calvo (1983)] process of price adjustment, firms review their prices periodically, i.e. the 
timing of the review is exogenous and does not depend on the state of the economy. 
Firms following state-dependent pricing rules review their prices whenever there is a 
large enough shock. A standard justification for this type of discontinuous adjustment is the 
existence of a fixed cost of changing prices [see, for instance, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), 
Caballero and Engel (1993), or Dotsey et al. (1999)]. The existence of price adjustment costs 
implies in state-dependent models that firms change their price only when the latter gets 
sufficiently “out of line” and, consequently, price reviews are likely to be a lot more frequent 
than price changes, as firms want to be aware of shocks in order to react as fast as possible. 
In time-dependent models, firms review –and change, if they find it optimal to do so– their 
price only on a periodic basis. 
                                                
6   Appendix B summarises the main characteristics of the market in which the firms operate. 
7  See Appendix B for an analysis of the comparability of the national surveys. 
8  This coincidence of results lessens to some extent the potential significance of the drawbacks 
traditionally attached to the use of surveys: first, the qualitative nature of the information gathered, which 
sometimes makes it difficult to ascertain the precise importance of a given statement; second, the lack of a 
time dimension, which means that they cannot be used to assess whether pricing patterns change over time; 
finally, the degree of uncertainty that surrounds the quality of the answers provided by the respondents. 
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Table 1.  Firms (in each category) following: 
 
a) Mainly time-dependent rules 
(percentages)(1) 
 
b) Both time- and state-dependent rules 
(percentages)(1) 
 
 
Notes: (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2) In the case of France, the issue has not 
been addressed directly; the information in the table has been estimated on the basis of the answers 
to other questions.   (3) Weighted average (GDP weights).   (4) As an indicator of the degree of 
competition we use the degree of perceived competition defined as the importance firms attribute to 
competitors’ prices in influencing a reduction in their own prices (unimportant, of minor importance, 
important, very important). Appendix B reports information on the degree of perceived competition for 
the samples used in the national surveys. 
 
In the presence of shocks, time-dependent pricing rules might lead to stickier prices 
than state-dependent rules. Hence, almost every national questionnaire investigates whether 
firms follow mainly time-dependent, state-dependent pricing rules, or a combination of both. 
In this latter case, the idea is that firms can follow time-dependent pricing rules as an 
implementation of state-dependent ones under a stable environment [as in Sheshinski and 
Weiss (1977)] rather than purely time-dependent rules. To distinguish between these two 
groups, some national questionnaires asked firms whether they switch to state-dependent 
rules upon the occurrence of specific events. 
Given that the firms following mainly time-dependent rules or both strategies 
are supposed, under certain assumptions, to introduce more rigidity in the price 
transmission mechanism than those following mainly state-dependent rules, our analysis 
1-49 50-199>=200goods trade services very low low high very high
BE 26 23 21 24 22 29 24 25 23 22 19
FR (2) 39 - - - 39 - - - - - -
DE 26 24 29 28 26 - - 27 21 25 33
ES 33 31 35 36 29 32 40 42 32 29 31
IT 40 - 39 42 40 35 45 37 35 51 19
LU 18 18 17 18 23 16 14 25 14 10 25
NL 36 34 42 - 26 34 40 35 36 35 36
AT 41 43 33 35 37 - 44 42 34 39 35
PT 35 33 36 42 32 - 63 47 42 38 25
EURO AREA (3) 34 32
Perceived competitionTotal Employees Sector
1-49 50-199 >=200 goods trade services very low low high very high
BE 40 39 47 44 42 36 48 43 40 44 38
FR (2) 55 - - - 55 - - - - - -
DE 55 56 53 58 55 - - 51 64 58 45
ES 28 24 29 32 25 24 34 18 29 33 31
IT 46 - 47 38 45 62 26 45 53 43 40
LU 32 29 34 36 27 39 32 25 39 33 27
NL 18 17 24 - 19 21 16 12 18 16 24
AT 32 30 39 44 36 - 29 35 37 36 39
PT 19 18 22 30 23 - 17 14 19 22 28
EURO AREA (3) 46 46
Perceived competition (4)Total Employees Sector
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 focuses on cross-country comparisons of the share of mainly time-dependent firms 
(Table 1a) and of those which follow both types of rules (Table 1b).9 
In the euro area as a whole 34% of the interviewed firms follow purely time-dependent 
rules; roughly around 35-40% for six countries (FR, ES, IT, NL, AT, PT) and below 30% 
for three countries (BE, DE, LU). These results are in line with those obtained by 
Blinder et al. (1998), who report that in the United States 40% of firms undertake meaningful 
periodic price reviews.10 Overall, the results are also consistent with the figures obtained for 
Sweden by Apel et al. (2005), who report that only 23% of the firms are found to follow 
time-dependent pricing rules when significant events occur. The results for the United 
Kingdom by Hall et al. (2000), however, are at odds with the above-mentioned ones, as 79% 
of the firms are found to be time-dependent (10% of the firms are found to follow both time 
and state-dependent pricing rules and 11% state-dependent rules).11 Around two-thirds of 
the companies in the euro area follow pricing rules with some element of state-dependence. 
Among these firms, those using a mixed strategy are predominant, except in four countries 
(ES, LU, NL, PT). 
The share of firms following mainly time-dependent rules generally increases slightly 
with the size of the firm when the number of employees is greater than 50; it is higher 
for services than for trade (except for Belgium and Luxembourg) and higher for trade than for 
industry (except for Italy and Luxembourg). There is, however, no clear-cut evidence on the 
relationship between pricing rules and the degree of market competition. 
 
Stylised fact 1 – Both time- and state-dependent pricing strategies are used by euro 
area firms. Around one-third of the companies follow mainly time-dependent pricing rules 
while the remaining two-thirds use pricing rules with some element of state-dependence. 
 
2.2 Information set used in price reviews 
The so-called New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) models, which emphasise rational 
expectations and hence the existence of forward-looking price-setters, are increasingly used 
for monetary policy analysis [see, for instance, Woodford (2003)]. Despite their theoretical 
success, however, these models generally fail to generate the sluggishness in price 
behaviour that is empirically observed. Conversely, hybrid versions of the NKPC including 
backward-looking or rule-of-thumb terms have been reported to provide a better 
representation of the observed price movements. The information set used by companies 
when making their pricing decisions has indeed important implications for the sluggishness of 
price adjustments in response to a broad range of disturbances. Backward-looking 
behaviour aside, price stickiness may also stem from firms using some form of rule-of-thumb 
in setting their price [Galí and Gertler (1999), and Galí et al. (2001)] or from indexation 
schemes [Christiano et al. (2005)] or from stickiness in gathering information [Mankiw 
and Reis (2002)]. In all these cases, deviations from fully optimising behaviour generate an 
additional source of sluggishness in the response of inflation to shocks. 
Six national surveys (BE, ES, IT, LU, AT, PT) provide data on the information set on 
which firms base their pricing decisions when they review their prices. This is an important 
piece of evidence that reflects different degrees of optimality of price setting strategies. 
Companies applying rules of thumb (for instance, changing prices by a fixed percentage, or 
                                                
9  Figures concerning  firms following mainly state dependent rules are not reported in the text. 
10  The gross figure for this share is 60%, but Blinder et al. (1998) remove the 20% of firms that change their 
prices less frequently than every fourth review and those reporting that they change their prices more 
frequently than they have price reviews. Indeed, the previous mentioned firms rely as much on reviews based 
on state-dependent rules as on time-dependent ones. 
11 Nevertheless, comparison of the share of mainly time-dependent firms across countries is uneasy because 
this figure may be very sensitive to the interpretation threshold between “mainly time-dependent” and “both 
time and state-dependent”. 
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following a CPI indexation rule) may end up charging a price that deviates substantially from 
the optimal price if a large shock occurs. In this sense, these companies behave 
non-optimally. At the other extreme, price reviews are addressed in an optimal way if 
companies use a wide set of indicators relevant for profit maximisation, including 
expectations about the future economic environment. 
On average, 48% of the firms in the euro area evaluate their prices on the basis of an 
information set that includes expectations about the future economic conditions (Table 2). 
There are some differences across countries in the share of forward-looking firms, which 
ranges from 28% in Spain to 68% in Italy. 
A large fraction of firms, however, does not behave optimally, either due to 
backward-looking behaviour or to the use of rules-of-thumb. About one third of firms take 
only historical data into account. For those surveys that included the rule-of-thumb option 
(such as indexation based on the consumer price index, a fixed percentage adaptation, etc.), 
the results indicate that this pricing method is adopted by 37% of firms in Belgium, 33% in 
Spain, 30% in Luxembourg and 25% in Portugal. 
Overall, the pattern of results reported in this section lends support to the recent wave 
of estimations of hybrid versions of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. 
 
Table 2.  Information set for pricing decisions 
(percentages) 
 
Note: (1) Weighted average (GDP weights). Note that the percentages for the euro area do not add up to 
100 as different answer-categories were used in the various countries. 
 
 
Information available for Spain and Luxembourg shows that smaller firms tend to be 
more backward-looking than larger ones and, conversely, larger firms tend to attach more 
importance than smaller ones to expectations about future conditions when assessing their 
prices. 
 
Stylised fact 2 – Around half of the firms review their prices taking into account a wide 
range of information, including both past and expected economic developments; one-third of 
them adopt a backward-looking behaviour. 
 
2.3 How often do firms review their prices? 
All national surveys contain a question about how often firms that follow 
time-dependent rules assess their prices. Typically, the respondents were given a choice 
among several categories (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.).12 Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Spain opted for a slightly different formulation, asking whether the respondents review 
                                                
12 All those firms indicating that they carry out periodic price reviews and those applying time-dependent pricing 
rules in normal circumstances (and state-dependent reviews in exceptional circumstances) were asked at 
what intervals they review their prices. 
BE ES IT LU PT AT EURO AREA (1)
Rule of thumb 37 33 n.a. 30 25 n.a.
Past/Present context 29 39 32 26 33 37 34
Present/Future context 34 28 68 44 42 12 48
Past, present and future n.a. n.a n.a. n.a n.a. 51
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 their prices more than once a year, once a year or less than once a year; within these 
categories respondents had to specify the number of times.13 
Table 3 groups the results into three classes: the share of respondents that review their 
price a maximum of three times a year, between four and eleven times a year, and at least 
twelve times a year. 
In all countries, the largest share of firms review their prices at most three times a year 
(57% for the euro area as a whole). 
 
Table 3.  Frequency of price reviews per year 
(percentages) (1) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (2)
> 12 4 30 7 31 28 26 37 29 5 26
4 – 11 8 17 7 22 14 20 19 25 26 17
< 3 88 53 86 47 57 54 44 46 69 57
median 1 3 1 4 1 2 4 4 2  
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2) Weighted averages 
(GDP weights). 
 
With respect to the median frequency of price reviews, countries can be classified into 
three groups: in Belgium, Spain and Italy the median firm checks its price once a year, while 
in France, the Netherlands and Austria checks are carried out on a quarterly basis; German, 
Luxembourg and Portuguese firms fall between the two. 
In order to find regularities in the price reviewing pattern in the euro area, we 
investigate whether firms’ size, sector and competitive environment have an effect on the 
reviewing behaviour. We apply a Chi-square test to examine whether the distribution of 
frequencies is equal for each of the aforementioned characteristics. Firm’s size explains 
differences in Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria. In all these 
countries, except France, large firms review their prices more frequently than smaller ones. 
Similarly, Amirault et al. (2004) find that large firms change prices significantly more often 
than small or medium-sized firms. They argue that senior staff at small firms has numerous 
tasks in addition to reviewing and adjusting prices and, consequently, managerial costs 
associated with the price setting process might be particularly onerous for small firms.14 
With regard to the degree of competition, firms facing higher competitive pressures 
review their prices more frequently. In seven out of the nine countries, firms indicating that 
competitors’ prices have a very important effect on their own pricing decisions review their 
prices more often than other firms. The exceptions are Austria and Belgium, where the 
competitive environment does not give rise to any difference. 
Finally, there are some interesting differences across sectors. The Chi-square test 
rejects the null hypothesis of equality across sectors in all seven countries for which 
this analysis is possible (in Germany and France services are not covered) at the 10% 
significance level. In five countries (IT, LU, NL, AT, PT), services firms review their 
prices significantly less frequently than firms operating in other sectors. Albeit not statistically 
significant, this tendency can also be observed in Belgium and Spain. In Spain, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands, firms in the trade sector review their prices significantly more often than 
                                                
13  As Table 3 shows, Belgium and Spain report significantly higher shares (nearly 90%) of respondents 
indicating that they review their prices at most three times a year. This result suggests that the format of the 
answer-categories might be relevant. 
14  They do not distinguish between the frequency of price reviews and the frequency of price changes and their 
argument probably has more to do with the price reviewing stage. 
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firms in the trade or services sectors. This is not the case for the other two countries that 
report results for trade (BE, IT). 
 
Stylised fact 3 – In most countries the modal number of price reviews lies in the range 
of one to three times a year. Services firms review prices less frequently than firms in the 
other sectors. Firms facing high competitive pressures review their prices more frequently.  
 
There may be different reasons for the finding that price reviews happen with a 
relatively low frequency. On the one hand, the frequency could be related to the (potentially 
sporadic) arrival of information. In other words, it may not make sense for firms to review 
their prices more often, as no additional information is available.15 On the other hand, there 
may be costs associated with price reviews. In the presence of informational costs, it may 
be optimal for firms to forego obtaining the most topical information instead of incurring the 
associated costs. This issue is investigated in Section 3.4. 
3. Price changes 
This section focuses on the implementation stage in the price adjustment process. In 
particular, we investigate to what extent firms follow a mark-up pricing rule. We also analyse 
to what extent firms use alternative forms of price discrimination. The section also documents 
the frequency of price changes and the empirical support of alternative theories of price 
stickiness. 
3.1 How do firms set prices? 
3.1.1 Mark-up pricing as a dominant strategy 
A standard result in imperfectly competitive models is that, under quite general 
conditions, firms choose to charge a price that represents a mark-up over marginal cost and 
have therefore some room for not adjusting it when facing a variation in costs.16 On the 
contrary, in the case of perfect competition, all firms belonging to the same market set their 
prices at a unique market clearing level; there is no mark-up and prices always equal 
marginal costs. Thus, price rigidities do not arise. 
All questionnaires address the issue of how companies set their prices. In some cases 
(BE, ES, LU, NL, AT, PT), firms were first asked to indicate whether they have an 
independent price setting policy, or whether their price is either regulated or set by the main 
company of the same group, or dictated by the main customer. Firms with an independent 
price-setting policy were asked to specify whether their price is set as a margin (mark-up) on 
costs or depends on the price of their main competitor(s) or is set according to other 
strategies.17 In the remaining countries, firms were directly asked to indicate their price 
setting rule, choosing from among the above-mentioned options. 
The option that the price is set as a margin applied to costs requires some clarification. 
First, its formulation varies marginally across the national questionnaires. The main reason is 
                                                
15  Kashyap (1995) rejects this hypothesis. He observes different reviewing behaviour also for products having 
similar cost and demand characteristics. However, if products are alike then the arrival of the necessary 
information should also be correlated. 
16  Within the models with imperfect competition, some assume time-varying mark-ups, with important 
implications for business cycle fluctuations. See sections 8 and 9 in Rotemberg and Woodford (1994) for an 
overview of different models with exogenously and endogenously determined time-varying mark-ups. 
17  The last option (mainly “regulated prices” and “price set by customers”) is included in only some 
questionnaires. 
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 that, whereas the theoretical literature refers to the concepts of mark-up and marginal costs, 
most businesspeople might not easily understand this terminology. In order to avoid 
confusion on the side of the respondents, the concept of mark-up has typically been 
translated into “profit margin” while the concept of marginal costs has been translated into a 
number of different expressions: “unit variable costs (cost of labour and of other inputs)”; 
“(variable) unit costs”; “unit variable production costs”; “variable production costs per unit”. 
Second, all country questionnaires investigate whether mark-up pricing is applicable in 
general terms, except in the cases of Belgium18, Germany and the Netherlands, where a 
distinction is made between constant and variable mark-up. 
Table 4 summarises the results of the national surveys by grouping the answers 
into three alternatives: “mark-up over costs”, “price set according to competitors’ prices”, and 
“other”. 
The results confirm findings of similar studies for the United Kingdom and the United 
States. In the euro area, more than half of the firms fix their price as a mark-up (fixed or 
variable) over costs. At the two extremes we find Germany (73%) and France (40%). For 
those countries (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) in which respondents could 
distinguish between constant and variable mark-up, the latter type dominates. In Belgium 
and Spain sectoral differences are very limited, whereas in Italy only 16% of firms in the 
trade sector follow this rule (see Table C1 in Appendix C); in the Netherlands this percentage 
is instead much higher (71%). 
 
Table 4.  Price setting rules  
(percentages)(1) 
 
DE ES FR IT NL PT EURO AREA
tot const var(2) tot const var tot const var (3) (4)
Markup 46 13 33 73 4 69 52 40 42 56 27 30 65 54
Competitors' price 36 17 27 38 32 22 13 27
Other 18 10 21 22 26 21 23 18
BE
 
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2) Firms adopting a mark-up price setting rule and 
responding "important" or "very important" to a least one of the theories concerning counter-cyclical mark-ups. 
(3) In the case of Portugal the issue was not addressed directly; the information reported in the table has been 
estimated on the basis of the answers to other questions.   (4) GDP weights. 
 
 
With respect to the size breakdown, the national surveys indicate that smaller firms 
tend to rely more on mark-up pricing than larger ones. This result, however, could be partly 
spurious, since in our sample large firms are in general found to face a higher degree of 
competition. 
Figure 1 shows a negative relationship between the share of firms following a mark-up 
rule and the degree of market competition. This finding, similar across countries, is 
consistent with the idea that in a highly competitive environment firms are essentially 
price-takers and do not fix their prices as a mark-up over costs. 
 
                                                
18 In the case of the Belgian survey, a distinction was made between the "actual" and the "desired" mark-up. The 
notion of desired mark-up is embedded in the specific wording used, referring explicitly to a "completely 
self-determined profit margin" rather than to a profit margin in more general terms. Moreover, the survey 
investigates in an indirect way whether desired mark-ups are variable, by testing the relevance of four 
theories, which generate endogenous counter-cyclical movements in desired mark-ups as a source of 
real rigidity. The importance attached to these theories allows computing the fraction of firms for which 
(counter-cyclical) variable mark-ups are applicable in the Belgian case. 
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 Stylised fact 4 – Mark-up (constant or variable) pricing is the dominant price setting 
practice adopted by firms in euro area. The lower the level of competition, the more 
frequently used this method is. 
 
Figure 1.  Mark-up rule and perceived competition 
(percentages) 
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Notes:   (1) Mean share for a “very low” and “low” degree of perceived competition.   (2) Mean share for 
a “very high” and “high” degree of perceived competition.   (3) For the Netherlands, the percentage of 
firms adopting a fixed mark-up is considered.   (4) Weighted average (GDP weights). 
 
The share of firms setting their price according to those of their main competitors 
ranges from 38% in France to 13% in Portugal. Differences with respect to size are 
moderate. 
 
Stylised fact 5 – Prices of around 30% of euro area firms are shaped by competitors’ 
prices. 
 
Finally, for a minority of respondents the price is set according to “other” rules. 
The share amounts to only 10% in Germany, while it rises to 26% in Italy, where it 
is particularly high in trade and services (49 and 40% respectively, see Table C1 in 
Appendix C), possibly due to the strict regulatory framework in such sectors.19 The 
percentage of companies following “other” rules is also generally higher in the case of 
large firms than in that of small firms. 
3.1.2 Price discrimination 
One of the main features characterising the price setting mechanism is the presence 
of some form of price discrimination. Generally, a firm is interested in applying 
price discrimination –i.e. in selling each unit of the same product at different prices either 
                                                
19  Trade and services are not included in the German survey. If goods only are considered, the share amounts to 
only 19% in Italy. 
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 to the same costumer or to different costumers– in order to extract a higher fraction of 
consumer surplus than it would be able to obtain if it charged a uniform price. 
Price discrimination may take many forms: the price of a product may vary according to 
the type of customer, the geographical area in which it is sold, the number of units purchased 
or the specific time at which it is sold, to name but a few.20 
The presence of some form of price discrimination is investigated in several of the 
national questionnaires. The findings presented in Figure 2 strongly reject the use of a 
uniform pricing scheme as a general rule to describe the price setting behaviour of euro area 
firms. In particular, the percentage of firms setting prices on a case-by-case basis or in 
accordance to the quantity of the product sold is, on average, around 80% in the euro area, 
ranging from 65% in Spain21 to 92% in Germany. In the other four countries (FR, IT, LU, PT) 
the figure is around 75%. 
 
Stylised fact 6 – Price discrimination is common practice for euro area firms. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Price discrimination 
(percentages) 
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Note: (1) Weighted average (GDP weights). 
 
There is not a clear relationship between the extent of price discrimination and the size 
of the companies, except in Luxembourg, which reported a positive relationship. By contrast, 
if anything, smaller firms seem to make a slightly more frequent use of differentiated prices in 
France, Italy and Portugal. 
More significant differences are found across sectors, although on this point the data is 
restricted to only few countries. In particular, uniform pricing is, as expected, more common 
in the trade sector. The share of companies in this sector charging the same prices to all 
customers is around 55% in Italy and Spain and 44% in Luxembourg. The corresponding 
                                                
20  See Chapter 3 in Tirole (1988) for a detailed theoretical analysis of alternative forms of price discrimination. 
21  In the Spanish case the number of firms using some form of price discrimination is likely to be higher, as firms 
are allowed to choose “other form of price discrimination” as a fourth option; these firms have not been taken 
into account in Figure 2. 
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 figures for the overall samples in these countries are 19%, 35% and 29%, respectively. At 
the other extreme, the share of companies setting their prices on a case-by-case basis or 
according to the quantity sold is highest in manufacturing, which may explain the high 
numbers for Germany (Figure 2).22 
Finally, no clear pattern arises in terms of the relationship between the frequency of 
price discrimination and the degree of competition. In four countries (DE, ES, LU, PT), the 
higher the intensity of competition, the higher the use of some forms of price discrimination. 
However, in France the lowest proportion of firms applying uniform pricing is found for those 
with an intermediate degree of competition. On the contrary, in Italy firms facing an 
intermediate degree of competition display the highest proportion of uniform pricing. 
3.1.3 Pricing to market 
The law of one price states that, adjusted for exchange rates, the price of a product 
must be the same across national markets. A substantial amount of empirical studies, 
however, rejects the validity of this law in the short run. A common explanation of departures 
from the law of one price is that transaction (arbitrage) costs between different geographical 
markets are high enough that firms can discriminate their prices across countries. In other 
words, when national markets are segmented by transport costs or other barriers, exporting 
firms are able to set a different price in each market. “Pricing to market” is the usual term in 
the international trade literature for price discrimination across national markets.23 
Given the open-economy nature of most euro area economies, the price setting 
behaviour of exporters is a relevant issue. The surveys conducted in Belgium, Spain, 
Luxembourg and Portugal include some specific questions, directed at firms operating in 
more than one market, which may provide valuable insights. 
Firstly, questionnaires for Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg ask whether the price 
charged in different countries is the same or not. Table 5 shows that around 50% of the 
exporting firms apply some form of pricing to market. As Aucremanne and Druant (2005) 
point out, this is a high proportion given that the exports of the countries considered are 
mostly directed towards the euro area. Price discrimination is even more frequent in the case 
of firms selling outside the euro area. In the Spanish sample, 60% of these companies 
charge different prices across non-euro area countries. In the case of Portugal, the question 
is put differently. It only involves those firms exporting to countries outside the euro area, 
which are asked what would happen to the local price of their product in the selected country 
if the euro appreciated by 5%. For about 60% of the firms, the price would either remain 
unchanged or increase by less than 5%. 
 
Table 5.  Pricing behaviour on foreign markets 
(percentages) 
BE ES LU
Price in euro is same for all countries 33 47 56
Price in euro is same for euro area countries 9 6 5
Price in euro is different for all countries 58 47 39  
 
                                                
22  In Luxembourg the highest share of price discriminating firms is found in the construction sector, where 
about 65% of firms discriminate case by case and a further 24% on the basis of the quantity sold. This reflects 
the different nature of this market, as a lot of business is made via public tenders and direct negotiations with 
customers. 
23  See pp. 711-712 in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for a brief review of the empirical evidence on pricing to 
market. 
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 The questionnaires in the four countries include a question on the importance of 
several factors in explaining differentiated price setting between markets. Table 6 reports the 
average scores of the different factors. 
One interesting observation is that the ranking is very similar in all four countries. 
Competitors’ market prices and transportation costs seem to be the most relevant 
determinants; cyclical fluctuations in demand rank immediately below. 
Exchange rate developments and structural market conditions have a moderate 
importance regarding the decision to apply pricing to market. Exchange rate movements 
receive a higher score for those firms exporting outside the euro area. Nevertheless, even for 
these firms this factor is ranked below –at least in the Spanish sample– competitors’ prices 
and demand. Finally, the local market tax system is generally singled out as the least 
important factor for explaining price differences across countries. As Aucremanne and 
Druant (2005) indicate, this factor is more important in consumer-oriented firms, for which 
differences in indirect taxation are presumably more relevant. 
 
Stylised fact 7 –- Competitors’ prices on the foreign market and transportation costs are 
the most relevant factors for pricing to market behaviour. 
 
 
Table 6.  Importance of factors in differentiated price setting across markets 
(mean scores)(1) 
 
BE ES LU PT
Price of competitors 3,4 3,2 3,3 -
Transportation costs and other factors 2,9 - 3,1 3,0
Cyclical fluctuations in demand 2,5 3,0 2,7 2,7
Structural market conditions 2,5 2,5 2,8 2,5
Exchange rate of payment currency 2,4 2,2 1,8 2,5
Market rules 2,1 - 2,7 2,8
Tax system 1,6 1,8 2,2 2,2
Note: (1) Respondents are asked to indicate the importance of each factor, the alternative scores
being (1) unimportant, (2) of minor importance, (3) important, (4) very important  
 
3.2 How often do firms change their prices? 
A first, although admittedly rough, measure of the degree of price stickiness is given 
by the number of price changes per year or, alternatively, by the average time elapsed 
between two consecutive price changes. The average duration of price spells is an 
essential ingredient in the calibration of DGSE models, which are widely used for 
monetary policy analysis [see, for instance, Woodford (2003), and Galí, López-Salido  and 
Vallés (2003)]. The empirical assessment of the degree of price flexibility has until very 
recently mainly relied on macroeconomic evidence.24 In recent years, the availability of 
large-scale data sets of individual consumer prices has contributed to improve the 
measurement of the duration of price spells [see, for instance, Dhyne et al. (2005)]. In this 
respect, survey results are useful for cross-checking the evidence obtained from these 
quantitative databases. 
                                                
24  Smets and Wouters (2003) and Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005) are two recent examples of papers 
providing estimates of the average duration of prices. 
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 All national surveys, except that for Germany, contain a question on the number of 
price changes per year.25 In particular, five questionnaires (BE, ES, LU, NL, AT) ask about 
the average number of price changes per year in recent years and three (IT, FR, PT) the 
number of price changes in a given year. 
Table 7 groups the results into four categories: (1) at least four price changes per 
year; (2) two or three price changes per year; (3) one price change per year, and (4) less 
than one price change.26 
The country results are very homogenous with the exception of Germany, where a 
different data source was used to obtain this specific information (see footnote 25). 
On average, almost 40% of the firms in the euro area change their price once a 
year (the percentage share rises to 51% if Germany is excluded from the computation 
of the mean). In all countries except Germany and Luxembourg, approximately 70% of 
the respondents adjust their price a maximum of once a year.27 On average, only 
around 34% of the firms change their price more frequently than once a year. 
In all but one country, the median firm changes its price once a year. These results 
are consistent with the evidence presented in Dhyne et al. (2005) who, on the basis of 
large-scale data sets of individual consumer price data for euro area countries, find 
that the average duration of a price spell, based on a set of indirect estimators, ranges 
from 4 to 5 quarters.28 Looking at the frequencies of price changes found in similar 
surveys for other countries, our results are in line with the findings of Apel et al. (2005) 
for Sweden, who report that the modal number of actual price changes per year 
lies at theyearly frequency. However, this yearly frequency is lower than the median 
frequencies of price changes per year found in Blinder et al. (1998) for the United States, 
Hall et al. (1997) for the United Kingdom and Amirault et al. (2004) for Canada; they 
report 1.4, 2 and 4 price changes per year, respectively. The relatively low frequency of price 
adjustment in the euro area when compared to the United States is consistent with the 
empirical evidence based on the analysis of micro CPI data [see Dhyne et al. (2005)] and on 
macro models [see Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2003)]. 
 
Table 7.  Frequency of price changes per year 
(percentages) (1) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (2)
> 4 8 21 14 9 11 27 11 11 12 14
2– 3 18 21 15 24 19 27 19 15 14 20
1 55 14 57 46 50 31 60 51 51 39
<1 18 44 14 21 20 15 10 24 24 27
median 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1  
 
Notes: (1)   Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2)Weighted averages (GDP weights). 
 
                                                
25  Since the German questionnaire does not contain a question on the number of price changes, the figures in 
Table 8 concerning Germany are based on the number of months with price changes in 2003, reported by 
the same sample of firms as in the IFO business survey. The figures are quite different from those obtained 
for the rest of the countries, probably on account of the particularly low demand faced by German firms in that 
year. 
26  The categories in Table 7 are not the same as those used in Table 3, since the number of price changes in 
most countries is considerably lower than that of price reviews. 
27  In Luxembourg this is largely due to the inclusion of the construction sector and its relative share in the 
responses (22%). Excluding this sector, as in the case of most other countries, would also result in a median 
of one price change per year. 
28  This comparison should be taken with some caution because the sample period of both data sources -surveys 
and micro CPI data- differs and because the survey on pricing behaviour includes both producer and 
consumer prices. 
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 As with price reviews, we also focus on whether there are common features underlying 
differences in price changing behaviour across countries. Again, the firms’ size is not 
relevant in most countries. Nevertheless, Hoeberichts and Stokman (2005) find in the Dutch 
survey, which is the only one containing information on one-person firms, that these firms 
have the most rigid prices. 
Conversely, the competitive environment and the sector help to explain differences in 
the frequency of price changes. The results are in line with those obtained for price reviews. 
With the exceptions of Austria and Portugal, in all countries firms facing strong competitive 
pressures tend to change their prices significantly more often than those not subject to 
such pressures. In all seven countries where the data covers more than one sector, the 
Chi-square test for the equality of the distribution of price-change frequencies across sectors 
rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level, pointing to significant sectoral differences. In five 
countries (BE, IT, LU, AT, PT) firms in the services sector change their prices less frequently 
than firms in other sectors; in four countries (ES, IT, LU, NL) firms operating in the trade 
sector change their prices more frequently than firms in other sectors. 
 
Stylised fact 8 – The median firm changes its price once a year. Prices are stickier in 
the services sector and more flexible in the trade sector. In most countries, firms facing 
strong competitive pressures adjust their prices more frequently. 
 
3.3 The relationship between price reviews and price changes 
Taking into account only the companies that provided information concerning the 
frequency of price reviews and the frequency of price changes, all countries report that price 
reviews are conducted more frequently than price changes. Even with the categorised data 
used, at the euro area level the share of firms changing their prices less than quarterly 
(a maximum number of three times per year) is 86%, compared with 57% of firms reviewing 
their prices with the same frequency (Table 8). Similar evidence is found in all but two 
countries.29 
 
Table 8.  Comparison between price reviews and price changes per year 
(percentages)(1) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (2)
Price reviews < 3 88 53 86 47 57 54 44 46 72 57
Price changes < 3 91 79 88 91 89 73 89 90 88 86  
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2) Weighted averages (GDP weights). 
 
 
Stylised fact 9 – Price changes are less frequent than price reviews. 
 
All in all, the evidence provided in this section is consistent with the notion that price 
adjustment takes place at two stages. First, the firms review their prices to check whether 
                                                
29  Both in Belgium and in Spain the frequency of price reviews is only slightly higher than the frequency 
of price changes. As already mentioned, this might be partly explained by the format of the answer-categories. 
In these two countries, firms are asked whether they review/change their prices more than once a year, 
once a year or less than once a year. A substantial fraction of firms indicate that they review/change their 
prices once a year. If these questions had been formulated allowing for more answer-categories, the fraction 
of firms declaring a yearly frequency of reviews/changes would have been lower. 
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 they are at the optimal level or need to be changed. As shown in Section 2.3, they do this at 
discrete time intervals (the majority of firms less than four times per year). Thus, some kind 
of stickiness can already be observed at the first stage of price setting. 
Once the price review has taken place, firms may change their prices. However, they 
do so less frequently than they review the prices. One explanation of why prices are left 
unchanged may be that there is no reason to change them.30 Alternatively, even though firms 
decided to incur the informational costs of the price review, there may be other factors 
effectively preventing a desired price adjustment. Such factors are addressed in the next 
section. 
3.4 Why do firms hold prices constant? 
The economic literature provides manifold explanations for sticky prices. As 
Blinder (1991) points out, however, it is difficult to evaluate how close the various 
theories come to the obstacles to changing prices encountered in the real world 
(one problem being observational equivalence). Thus, Blinder applied the interview 
method as a new way of examining the empirical relevance of different theories. 
He explained selected theories in face-to-face interviews with managers and assumed 
that they would recognise the line of reasoning if it came close to their way of thinking. 
All the national surveys on which this paper is based apply similar methodologies, 
presenting managers with different theories chosen according to their relevance in the 
economic literature, as well as their rankings in the surveys already conducted for other 
countries [Apel et al. (2005), Blinder et al. (1998) and Hall et al. (1997)]. Before turning to 
the results, we summarise the most relevant theories. 
1. Cost-based pricing. Inputs’ costs are an important determinant in a firm's pricing 
decision. One line of reasoning based on this argument is that if costs do not change, prices 
will not change either. As products pass different production stages, a (demand or cost) 
shock somewhere in the production chain will take some time until it is propagated through 
the chain to finally reach consumers. Blanchard (1983) models production chains with n 
stages and assumes adjustment lags at each level of production. Even small lags in the 
adjustment process of a single firm can add up to long lags, when taking into account 
the whole production chain. 
2. Explicit contracts. Firms have contractual arrangements with their customers, which 
may be in written form or orally agreed and in which they guarantee to offer a certain product 
at a specific price. An explanation why firms engage in such agreements is that it is in their 
interest to build up long-run customer relationships in order to stabilise their future sales. 
Customers, on the other hand, are attracted by a constant price because it makes their 
future costs more predictable and helps to minimize transaction costs (e.g. shopping time). 
Thus, customers might focus on the long-run average price rather than on the spot 
price. This is probably the most straightforward explanation of sticky prices. The idea that 
explicit contracts may be central for price stickiness was first introduced in the economic 
literature through wage contracts [e.g. Fischer (1977)]. 
3. Implicit contracts. This explanation is closely linked to the explicit contract theory, but 
goes one step further. With implicit contracts firms also want to build up long-run customer 
relationships, and they try to win customer loyalty simply by changing prices as little as 
possible. This idea goes back to Okun (1981), who distinguishes between price increases 
due to cost shocks and those that are due to demand shocks. He argues that higher 
costs are an accepted rationale for rising prices, while increases in demand are viewed as 
unfair. Consequently, firms hold prices constant in the face of demand shocks, as they do not 
                                                
30  Although almost all national surveys address the issue of price reviews and price changes while referring 
to “normal conditions”, in most cases it is not possible to control for the fact that the observed price behaviour 
is in fact related to the occurrence of particular shocks, either of an idiosyncratic nature or of a common one. 
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 want to jeopardize customer relationships. They only adjust prices in response to cost 
shocks. The idea that consumers wish to buy from firms whose prices are “fair” is also 
applied by Rotemberg (2005). 
4. Co-ordination failure. This theory focuses on the interactions between firms 
as explanation for sticky prices. Like in the case of explicit contracts this idea was 
first introduced for the analysis of the labour market [e.g. Clower (1965) and 
Leijonhufvud (1968)]. The argument is that the firm assumes that if it were to raise its price, it 
would lose customers as no other firm would follow suit. On the other hand, if the firm were 
to decrease its price, it would not increase its market share as all competitors would follow 
suit. After a shock a firm might, thus, want to change its price, but only if the other firms also 
change their prices. Without a co-ordinating mechanism that allows firms to move together, 
prices may remain fixed. 
5. Menu costs. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) motivate the idea that the act of changing 
prices –printing and distributing new price lists– generates costs. Thus, a company 
facing these costs will change its prices less frequently than an otherwise identical firm 
without such costs. Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) show that even “small” 
costs of changing prices can lead to nominal rigidities with “large” macroeconomic effects. 
In order to distinguish between different kinds of costs associated with price changes, we will 
use the term menu cost in a narrow sense and focus on the physical cost of changing prices. 
6. Costly information. Ball and Mankiw (1994) suggest a broader use of the term menu 
costs, in the sense that it includes more than just the physical costs of changing prices. 
In particular they argue that “the most important costs of price adjustment are the time and 
attention required of managers to gather the relevant information and to make and implement 
decisions” (p. 142). The distinction between these informational costs and physical menu 
costs enables us to investigate their relative importance in pricing decisions. 
7. Temporary shocks. When firms regard the shock they are face as temporary, they 
may consider appropriate to forego a price adjustment, as they expect the optimal new 
price to be short-lived as well. It is not relevant whether the shock is indeed temporary or not, 
the main issue being how the firms assess the duration of the shock. 
8. Change non-price factors. The price of a product is just one feature that can be 
adjusted in reaction to a changing environment. Firms can vary the delivery time, modify 
the quality of the product or alter the level of service they offer in relation to the sale, to name 
but a few of the options that they have. 
9. Judging quality by price. This line of reasoning reverses the argument used in 
the theory above addressing the issue of non-price factors. The argument is that firms do 
not decrease the price of their product because customers might wrongly interpret the 
price decrease as a reduction in quality. Thus, they prefer to hold their nominal prices 
constant. 
10. Pricing thresholds. Firms may set their prices at psychological attractive thresholds, 
for example choosing EUR 9.90 instead of EUR 10.00. Attractive pricing strategies can 
cause price stickiness, because firms may postpone price adjustments in face of small 
shocks calling for small price changes until new events justify a large price change to the 
next pricing threshold. 
All the national questionnaires asked the managers a question along the following 
lines: “If there are reasons for changing the price of your main product, which of the 
following factors may well prevent an immediate price adjustment?”. The list following this 
question offers the ten above mentioned theories, expressed in simple terms, as possible 
explanations. The respondents could indicate their degree of agreement with each theory, 
choosing from among four categories: unimportant (1), of minor importance (2), important (3) 
and very important (4), where the numbers in brackets indicate the scores attached 
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 to each category.31 Columns 1 to 9 in Table 9 present the mean scores assigned by the 
firms in each country to the various theories. Column 10 reports the average of the country 
results, which is taken as an indication of the overall ranking for the euro area. Based on 
this ranking, two groups of theories can be distinguished: the first consists of those theories 
that have an average score well above 2, while the second comprises the remaining ones. 
The last four columns of the table show the ranking of the same theories in the surveys by 
Blinder et al. (1998) for the United States, Apel et al. (2005) for Sweden, Hall et al. (1997) for 
the United Kingdom and Amirault et al. (2004) for Canada. 
The theory of “implicit contracts” receives the highest average score (2.7) and ranks 
first in five country studies. With an average score of 2.6, “explicit contracts” is the second 
most important explanation for sticky prices at the euro area level (it ranks most important 
in four countries). The same average score is attributed to “cost-based pricing”. Finally, with 
an average score of 2.4, “co-ordination failure” can also be regarded as a relevant factor 
behind price stickiness. 
Implicit and explicit contracts are both based on the idea that firms want to establish 
long-run relationships with customers in order to make future sales more predictable. The 
high score obtained by these theories is consistent with the data presented in Table 10, 
which shows that long-term relationships with customers are indeed a widespread 
phenomenon in the euro area. In this respect, Okun (1981) argues that price increases which 
are due to cost increases are viewed as fair by customers, while price increases which are 
due to a tight market are regarded as unfair. If this is the case –and the results suggest that 
managers indeed share this perception– it would be more likely that firms increase their 
prices in response to cost shocks than to demand shocks. 
 
Table 9.  The importance of theories explaining price stickiness 
(mean scores) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (1) US SW UK CA (2)
Implicit contracts 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.1 2.7 4 1 5 2/7
Explicit contracts 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.5 3.0 2.6 2.6 5 3 1 3
Cost-based pricing 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6 2 2 2 1
Co-ordination failure 2.2 2.2 2.4 3.0 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.8 2.4 1 4 3 5/8
Judging quality by price 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.1 12 10
Temporary shocks 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.7 2.4 1.5 2.5 2.0
Change non-price factors 1.7 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 3 8 4
Menu costs 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.6 6 11 11 10
Costly information 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 13 10
Pricing thresholds 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.8 1.6 8 7 4  
 
Notes: (1)   Unweighted average of countries’ scores. Columns 11 to 14 report the ranking of the theories in 
Blinder et al. (1998), Appel et al. (2005), Hall et al. (1997) and Amirault et al. (2004), respectively.   (2) In the 
column for Canada, two figures are reported for the implicit contracts and co-ordination failure theories, 
because in the Canadian questionnaire there are two different statements related to these theories. 
 
The theories ranked third and fourth are consistent with the price setting strategies 
indicated by firms as the most common ones. Cost-based pricing, which ranks third, 
confirms the findings of Section 3.1.1, where we report that the majority of firms set their 
price as a mark-up over costs. In other words, relatively stable costs and/or the sluggishness 
of the price response to cost changes are an important explanation for sticky prices. 
The theory ranked fourth –co-ordination failure– relates instead to the interaction between 
                                                
31  In the Dutch questionnaire the scaling is more detailed (from 1 to 10). Results have been re-scaled for 
comparability. 
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 firms on the same market. As shown in Section 3.1.1, nearly 30% of the firms follow 
the competitor’s price when they decide upon their own price. Together with the fear of a 
lack in coordinating price movements, this provides a further explanation for sticky prices, 
namely, that firms prefer not to change their prices as long as none of their competitors 
moves first. 
 
Table 10.  Firms-customers relationships 
(percentages)(1) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (2)
long term 78 57 86 54 98 85 81 83 70
occasional 22 43 14 46 2 15 19 17 30  
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses. In the case of Belgium, 
France and Italy, this refers to relationships with other firms.   (2) Weighted averages 
(GDP weights). 
 
Each of the top four theories ranks either first or second in the studies available for 
non-euro area countries [Blinder et al. (1998), Appel et al. (2005), Hall et al. (1997) and 
Amirault et al. (2004)]. Moreover, the fact that the national surveys for the euro area were 
conducted in different ways confirms that the findings do not depend on the survey method, 
on the particular wording used or on the ordering of the answer-categories.32 
The importance attached to the various theories differs only slightly across sectors (for 
detailed results see Table C5 in Appendix C). In particular, in the goods and the services 
sectors the ranking is very similar to the one presented in Table 9. There are small 
differences in the trade sector: explicit contracts receive a lower average score (2.0) while, 
as expected, pricing thresholds are slightly more important than in the other sectors. 
The remaining theories are on average not considered as important obstacles to price 
adjustment by euro area firms. This group includes prominent candidates such as physical 
menu costs and costly information. Although they are frequently used explanations for price 
stickiness in the theoretical literature [e.g. Ball and Mankiw (1994)], in practice they seem to 
be of minor importance. Furthermore, the ranking attached to the various causes behind 
price stickiness provides some evidence on whether these factors have a greater bearing on 
the first or the second stage of price adjustment, as discussed in Section 3.3. Our analysis 
suggests that, for the majority of the firms, the main obstacles are not associated with the 
review stage but rather with the price change stage. In fact, the theory labelled “information 
costs” –i.e. costs associated with gathering and processing information for pricing decisions 
(stage one of price adjustment)– receives one of the lowest scores in all the country 
questionnaires that included this category. A similar result is reported by Apel et al. (2005) 
and Amirault et al. (2004). 
Stylised fact 10 – Implicit and explicit contracts are the most relevant explanations for 
sticky prices, which suggests that price rigidities are associated with customers’ preference 
for stable nominal prices. Other relevant explanations rest on cost-based pricing and 
co-ordination failure. These results suggest that the main impediments for more frequent 
price adjustment are associated with the price change stage rather than with the price review 
stage of the price setting process. 
 
                                                
32  The ordering of the theories  differs considerably across the various questionnaires. For example, in the Dutch 
questionnaire the theory of implicit contracts is the second answer-category, while it appears in ninth 
place in the Austrian questionnaire. Nevertheless, in both country studies, the theory is regarded as the most 
important explanation. Overall, we do not find an association between the ordering of the answer-categories 
and the scores given to the theories by respondents. 
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 Overall, our findings are in line with the results of Zbaracki et al. (2004), who report 
quantitative estimates of the different costs of price adjustments. They differentiate 
between costs of producing and distributing price sheets (what we call menu costs), 
managerial costs (information costs in our terminology) and customer costs of price 
adjustments. They conclude that while approximately one quarter of the overall costs of 
changing prices are due to menu costs and information costs, three quarters arise because 
customers dislike price changes.33 
4. Factors driving price changes 
4.1 Asymmetries of price reactions 
The empirical literature provides evidence that price increases and price decreases do 
not occur with the same (conditional) probability. Dhyne et al. (2005) show for the euro area 
that price reductions are moderately less frequent than price increases: four out of ten price 
changes are decreases.34 Analogous results are obtained by Lünnemann and Mathä (2005b) 
using price index data. Asymmetries are also found with respect to the size of price changes, 
as average price increases tend to be smaller than average price decreases. The results for 
the United States are quite similar: Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004) report that 45% of all price 
changes are price reductions. 
In order to analyse what drives price changes and whether there are asymmetries 
depending on the direction of the price adjustment, all national surveys included questions 
about factors that are important for pricing decisions. Respondents were asked to assign 
scores between 4 (very important) and 1 (completely unimportant) to cost factors (labour 
costs, raw material costs and financial costs) and market conditions (demand and 
competitors’ prices) according to their importance for price adjustment. The question was 
posed separately for price increases and decreases. The results are presented in Tables 11 
and 12, respectively, which contain the mean scores for every factor in each country as well 
as the euro area average score in the last column. 
Table 11 shows that costs of raw materials and labour costs are the most important 
factors in driving prices upwards. These factors receive an average score of 3.0 and rank 
first and second in every country. As for price decreases, Table 12 shows that competitor’s 
price (with an average score of 2.8) is the most important element for downward price 
adjustments, followed by changes in demand conditions and costs of raw materials. Financial 
costs do not seem to be relevant. These results hold for all sectors and are not sensitive to 
differences in the firm’s size (as can be seen in Figure C1 and C2 in Appendix C). 
To conclude, at the euro area level firms are more prompted to change their prices in 
response to shocks that lead to profit losses (rising costs of raw materials and labour as well 
as a decrease in the competitor’s price) than to shocks leading to profit gains (decreasing 
labour and financial costs as well as improving demand conditions and an increase in the 
competitor’s price). 
The national surveys were conducted in periods (see Appendix A for details) 
characterised by different growth rates across the nine countries. However, despite 
differences in business cycle conditions, the results are very similar. In other words, 
the answers provided by the respondents concerning the factors driving their prices 
do not seem to be sensitive to the economic outlook prevailing at the time the national 
surveys were conducted. 
 
                                                
33  While our results suggest that menu costs and information costs are equally unimportant (in relation to 
other costs, especially customer costs), Zbaracki et al. (2004) estimate that managerial costs are six times the 
menu costs. 
34  Some country surveys (FR, NL, PT) investigate the share of price increases and decreases, which turn out to 
be around 70 and 30% respectively. 
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 Table 11.  The importance of different factors driving price increases 
(mean scores) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (1)
Labour costs 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.9 3.5 2.7 3.4 3.3 3.0
Costs of raw materials 2.9 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.3 - 2.5 3.1 3.6 3.1
Financial costs 2.2 1.9 1.8 - 2.3 3.0 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.2
Demand 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.4 2.3 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.2
Competitors’ price 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.0 2.7 2.4  
 
Note:   (1) Unweighted average of countries’ scores. 
 
Table 12.  The importance of different factors driving price decreases 
(mean scores) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (1)
Labour costs 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.3 3.0 2.1
Costs of raw materials 2.3 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.9 - 2.0 2.2 3.3 2.6
Financial costs 1.8 1.6 1.5 - 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.6 2.3 1.9
Demand 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.0 3.0 2.5
Competitors’ price 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.9 2.8  
 
Note:   (1) Unweighted average of countries’ scores. 
 
In order to present an even clearer picture on the asymmetries in the driving factors for 
price increases and decreases, Figure 3 shows the difference of the reported scores for each 
factor. The results reveal a strikingly regular pattern of positive asymmetries for costs and 
negative asymmetries for market conditions. 
 
Figure 3.  Asymmetries in price driving factors 
(difference between scores regarding price rises and price decreases) 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO
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Labour costs Costs of raw material Financial costs Demand Competitors' price
 
Note:   (1) Unweighted average of countries’ scores. 
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 Stylised fact 11 – Cost shocks are more relevant in driving prices upwards than 
downwards, while shocks to market conditions (changes in demand and the competitor’s 
price) matter more for price decreases than for price increases. 
 
Our findings about cost shocks are in line with the conclusions from Peltzman (2000) 
who suggests that output prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks depending on the 
direction of the shock. He provides evidence that, on average, prices respond faster to input 
price increases than to decreases and that the immediate response after a positive cost 
shock is at least twice the response to a negative shock.  
The importance of implicit contracts as explanation for price stickiness, revealed in 
Section 3.4, may provide a rationale for this asymmetry. If, as argued by Okun’s “customer 
market” theory, customers view price increases due to cost increases as fair and price 
increases due to increased demand as unfair, firms sould be more likely to increase their 
prices in response to cost shocks than to demand shocks, as they try to avoid jeopardising 
customer relationships. 
While Peltzman (2000) only focuses on the asymmetry with regard to cost shocks, we 
additionally find that demand shocks also affect prices asymmetrically. Negative demand 
shocks seem to be more likely to induce price adjustments than positive demand shocks. 
Interpreting monetary policy shocks as demand shocks, we can compare our results with the 
discussion in the literature. Two classes of models can be identified. Both imply asymmetric 
effects of money on output35, but they have different implications about how nominal 
shocks affect prices. The first strand of literature is based on the assumption of a convex 
aggregate supply curve [e.g. Ball and Romer (1989 and 1990), Caballero and Engel (1992), 
and Tsiddon (1993)]. These models imply that positive money-supply shocks have a larger 
effect on prices than negative ones. In contrast to this conclusion, the second strand of 
literature argues that positive money-supply shocks have a smaller effect on prices than 
negative ones. De Long and Summers (1988) associate this view with models focusing on 
credit rationing in the monetary transmission mechanism. They argue that positive nominal 
shocks have a smaller effect on aggregate demand and thus also a smaller effect on prices 
(assuming a linear supply curve). Our results support the second strand of literature, which 
sometimes is referred to as “pushing on a string” [see Karras (1996)]. 
Finally, section 3.2 showed that in nearly all countries firms facing stronger competitive 
pressures tend to change their prices significantly more often than those not subject to 
such pressures. Thus, we expect the degree of competition to matter also in shaping pricing 
behaviour when it comes to the driving forces of price adjustment. The influence of 
competition is shown separately for price-raising shocks in Figure 4 and price-decreasing 
shocks in Figure 5. As the differences between countries are limited, we present average 
scores for the euro area for two types of firms, namely firms facing either severe or limited 
competition. 
The degree of competition indeed matters. For firms facing higher competitive 
pressures cost and demand factors are more important in pricing decisions. The differences 
between the two groups are largest in the case of price-decreasing shocks, especially on the 
demand side. Interestingly, the results of the national surveys suggest that price responses 
to labour cost shocks are more or less the same regardless of the degree of competition. 
An explanation might be that in most euro area countries wage adjustments are the 
outcome of yearly or half-yearly collective bargaining agreements at the national or sectoral 
level and, thus, all firms in a sector are equally affected. 
                                                
35  Cover (1992) concludes that positive shocks in the money supply have no significant effect on output, 
whereas negative shocks reduce output. These results about the asymmetry of monetary policy shocks with 
regard to the sign of the shocks are also confirmed by other studies [e.g. Karras (1996) and De Long and 
Summers (1988)]. 
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 Figure 4.  Perceived competition and price-raising factors in the euro area (1) 
(average scores) 
1
2
3
4
labour costs raw materials financial costs demand
no competition severe competition
 
Note:   (1) Unweighted averages of countries’ scores. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Perceived competition and price-reducing factors in the euro area (1) 
(average scores) 
1
2
3
4
labour costs raw materials financial costs demand
no competition severe competition
 
Note:   (1) Unweighted averages of countries’ scores. 
 
 
Stylised fact 12 – Firms in highly competitive markets are more likely to respond to 
changes in underlying factors, especially in the case of demand shocks. 
 
4.2 Price adjustment after shocks 
Five countries (ES, FR, LU, AT, PT) investigated further the issue of price reactions 
after shocks, focusing also on the time lag of the price response. Firms were asked 
whether they change their prices in reaction to a specific shock or not. In the case of a 
positive answer, they were requested to indicate the time (number of months) elapsed before 
the price change is implemented. 
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 Table 13.  Firms not adjusting their prices in response to a shock 
(percentages)(1) 
 
higher demand lower demand higher costs lower costs
ES 33 26 13 25
FR 23 22 18 27
LU 38 33 12 32
AT 63 52 8 38
PT 34 26 9 19  
 
Note:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses. 
 
 
Table 14.  Speed of price adjustment after shocks 
(percentages)(1) 
 
higher demand lower demand higher costs lower costs
ES
<1 month 18 21 15 13
1 – 3 months 17 21 18 18
>3 months 65 58 67 69
FR
<1 month 35 37 34 31
1 – 3 months 34 35 27 29
>3 months 31 28 39 40
LU
<1 month 34 42 47 40
1 – 3 months 24 31 25 28
>3 months 42 27 28 32
AT
<1 month 4 3 2 2
1 – 3 months 51 71 65 61
>3 months 45 26 33 37
PT
<1 month 22 28 24 23
1 – 3 months 31 32 27 33
>3 months 47 40 49 44  
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses. 
 
 
Table 13 presents the share of respondents answering that they hold their prices 
constant in reaction to a specific shock. The results support the same conclusion about 
asymmetries as the previous section, though the issue is approached from a different 
angle: lower demand is more likely to lead to price adjustments than higher demand, while 
the opposite is true for cost shocks. Moreover, comparing the first and third columns, 
we observe that a larger share of firms adjust their price in reaction to increasing costs than 
to higher demand, which further corroborates what found in Section 3.4 and 4.1. 
Table 14 refers to the firms that change their price after a shock: it presents the 
share of respondents that adjust prices within a month, between 1 and 3 months and after a 
period of more than 3 months. The median firm changes its price 1 to 3 months after a shock 
in France, Luxemburg, Austria and Portugal, while the median firm in Spain waits for more 
than 3 months –regardless of the sign and source of the shock. Thus, an adjustment process 
of one quarter in macro models for France, Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal and of two or 
more quarters for Spain seems to be justified on the ground of these findings. 
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 4.3 Determinants of the probability of price adjustments after shocks 
In order to analyse what underlying factors (e.g. characteristics of the firm or the 
market the firm is operating in) might explain the probability of a price change in response to 
a shock, four countries (FR, ES, IT, AT) estimated simple probit models of the general form: 
)...()( mjmjj xbxbFyP ++== 111  
where F is the cumulative function of the normal distribution, yj is a zero-one dummy, P(yj=1) 
denotes the probability of observing a change in firm j’s price in response to a demand or 
a cost shock36 and xij represents a set of i explanatory variables for firm j, which might 
influence the way in which prices react to shocks. Among these variables, a number 
of factors are considered, for example the degree of market competition, the shape of 
the marginal cost curve, the relationships with customers, regulated prices, the export share 
and the cost structure.37 The models are estimated separately for upward and downward 
demand and cost shocks.38 
The main results from this exercise are summarised in Table 15. There is some 
evidence that real rigidities, as captured by a flat marginal cost curve and by the fact that 
customers incur high search costs as well as a low export share reduce the responsiveness 
of prices to positive demand shocks. Furthermore, the results from all four countries suggest 
that price stickiness in response to demand shocks is higher when the degree of market 
competition is lower. This finding is valid for upward and downward shocks to demand and 
underlines the results shown in Figure 4 and 5, namely that changes in demand are more 
likely to induce a price reaction when competition is higher. Finally, the impact of the cost 
structure on the probability of price adjustment has been explored in the Spanish survey.39 
The results indicate that the higher is the labour share, the lower is the price response to 
both types of shocks. Moreover, the higher is the share of energy inputs on total costs the 
higher is the probability of a fast price adjustment, although this effect is not significant in 
the case of costs shocks. The underlying idea is that as wage changes typically take place 
once a year we expect more labour intensive industries to carry out price revisions less 
frequently. On the contrary, given that oil products change their prices very often, firms which 
are highly intensive in the use of energy inputs in the production process are expected to 
adjust their prices more often. 
 
                                                
36  For Spain, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is set to unity if the firm declares that it changes its 
price within a period of three months after the shock and zero otherwise. 
37  In principle, for given nominal rigidities (due, for instance, to the presence of menu costs), stronger 
competition should induce a greater responsiveness of prices to cost and demand shocks [Martin (1993), and 
Small and Yates (1999)]. Similarly, the existence of a long-standing relationship between a firm and its 
customers is likely to generate a resistance to change prices continuously in order not to disappoint the 
customers. As Hall (1986) recognises, variable marginal costs should make price adjustments more likely in 
the face of a shock. 
38  For Austria, a further distinction has been made between large and small shocks. In the case of France and 
Italy, pooled results for upward and downward shocks are also available. 
39  Both the labour share and the share of energy inputs have been measured at the NACE 2-digit level. 
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 Table 15.  Factors underlying price flexibility 
(main results of probit analysis)(1) 
FACTORS
Demand 
increase
Demand 
decrease
Demand 
increase
Demand 
decrease
Demand 
increase
Demand 
decrease
Demand 
increase
Demand 
decrease
High competition + + + + + + no +
Variable marginal costs + no no no + no n.a. n.a.
Low search costs + no no no + + n.a. n.a.
Regulated price no no no no n.a. n.a. − −
High export share no no + no + + n.a. n.a.
Labour share n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. − −
Share of energy inputs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + +
Costs 
increase
Costs 
decrease
Costs 
increase
Costs 
decrease
Costs 
increase
Costs 
decrease
Costs 
increase
Costs 
decrease
High competition − − + no no no no no
Low search costs no no − − no no n.a. n.a.
Regulated price − no − − n.a. n.a. − −
High export share − − no no no no n.a. n.a.
Labour share n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. − −
Share of energy inputs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. no no
IT FR AT ES
 
Note:   (1) “+” denotes that the factor is positively and significantly related to the probability of a price increase/ 
decrease in response to an increase/decrease in demand/costs; “-” denotes that the factor is negatively and 
significantly related to the probability of a price increase/decrease in response to an increase/decrease in 
demand/costs; “no” denotes that the factor is not significantly related to the probability of a price increase/ 
decrease in response to an increase/decrease in demand/costs. “n.a” indicates that the factor is not included in 
the probit model. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This study investigates the pricing behaviour of firms, based on the responses of 
around 11,000 euro area companies surveyed by nine Eurosystem NCBs. The information 
collected sheds light on important aspects that can hardly be assessed otherwise, such as 
price-setting practices, the information set used in the price-adjustment process, reasons 
for price stickiness and asymmetries in pricing behaviour. 
The evidence appears to be very robust across countries and neither affected by the 
differences in the national questionnaires (such as different languages, different wording 
and differences in answer categories, etc.) nor by the business cycle conditions prevailing in 
the countries at the time the surveys were conducted. Consequently, it is possible to draw 
conclusions for the euro area as a whole, a summary of which is given below. 
Regarding the reviewing stage of the price setting process our evidence suggests that 
both time- and state-dependent pricing strategies are applied by firms in the euro area. 
Around one-third of the companies follow mainly time-dependent pricing rules while the 
remaining two-thirds use pricing rules with some element of state-dependence. Although 
the majority of firms take into account a wide range of information, including past and 
expected economic developments, about one-third adopts a purely backward-looking 
behaviour. The pattern of results lends support to the recent wave of estimations of hybrid 
versions of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve including past inflation in order to explain 
inflation developments. 
Two pieces of evidence from our surveys suggest that the model of perfect competition 
with the law of one price does not seem to be the blue print for most of the goods and 
service markets in the euro area. Firstly, mark-up pricing is the dominant price setting 
practice adopted by firms in the euro area, which suggests that these firms have some form 
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 of market power and can set their prices above marginal costs. Secondly, price 
discrimination is a common practice among euro area firms. In particular, the share of firms 
setting prices on a case-by-case basis or depending on the quantity of the product sold is, on 
average, around 80% in the euro area. This also suggests that models with monopolistic 
competition, like New Keynesian models, may be a better description for most goods and 
service markets than those that assume perfect competition. 
In most countries the modal number of price reviews lies in the range of one to three 
times per year and in nearly all countries on which this report is based, the median firm 
changes its price once a year. This result is in line with the evidence presented in 
Dhyne et al. (2005) who, on the basis of individual consumer price data for euro area 
countries, find that the average duration of a price spell ranges from 4 to 5 quarters. 
However, this yearly frequency is lower than the median frequency of price changes per 
year reported in Blinder et al. (1998) for the United States, which lies at 1.4 price changes 
per year. This result is consistent with the comparison between the two areas based on the 
analysis of micro CPI data [see Dhyne et al. (2005)] and with the estimates on price duration 
based on macro models [see Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2003)]. 
There are some significant differences across sectors with regard to the frequency of 
price adjustments. Services firms review and change prices less often than others –a result 
supported by Dhyne et al. (2005), and Lünnemann and Mathä (2005b). Furthermore, we find 
that firms operating in the trade sector adjust their prices more frequently. Another structural 
characteristic explaining differences in the frequency of price adjustment is the competitive 
pressure the firms are facing: companies operating in markets with severe competition 
review and adjust their prices more frequently. The degree of competition in a market indeed 
seems to matter for pricing strategies. We provide evidence that the lower the level of 
competition, the more frequently firms use mark-up rules in their pricing decisions. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that firms in highly competitive markets are more likely to 
respond to changes in underlying factors (e.g. cost and demand factors potentially driving 
price changes) than firms facing low competition. 
Overall, our results are in line with the idea that price setting takes place at two stages. 
First, firms review their prices to check whether they are at the optimal level or whether they 
need to be changed. Second, if firms find out that the price deviates from its optimal level, 
they need to decide whether to change the price or not. We provide evidence that there are 
obstacles to price adjustments at both stages. However, the main obstacles to price 
adjustment lie at the second stage of price setting. In contrast to the suggestion of Ball and 
Mankiw (1994), informational costs, which are important at the reviewing stage of price 
setting, do not seem to be among the most important obstacles to price changes. The fear 
that a price adjustment could jeopardize customer relationships (expressed in the theories on 
implicit and explicit contracts) is found to be a much more important explanation for rigid 
prices. This finding is consistent with the results of Zbaracki et al. (2004), who conclude that 
one quarter of the overall costs of changing prices is due to menu costs and information 
costs, while three quarters are arising because customers dislike price changes. The implicit 
contract theory going back to Okun (1981), which was recognised as very relevant by our 
respondents, suggests that customers regard price increases in response to cost shocks as 
fairer than price adjustments in response to demand shocks. This finding ties in with 
Rotemberg (2005), who also argues that fairness is an important driving force in customers' 
buying decisions. 
Finally, we provide evidence that firms adjust prices asymmetrically in response to 
shocks, depending on the source of the shock and the direction of the adjustment. Changes 
in costs are the main factor underlying price increases, whereas changes in market 
conditions (demand and competitors’ prices) are the driving forces behind price reductions. 
Moreover, prices seem to be more flexible downwards than upwards in response to demand 
shocks, while the opposite result holds in the face of cost shocks. 
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 Appendix A – Surveys’ characteristics 
 
  
WHEN WAS 
THE SURVEY 
CONDUCTED 
 
WHO 
CONDUCTED 
THE SURVEY 
 
HOW WAS THE 
SURVEY 
CONDUCTED 
 
SAMPLE 
 
# FIRMS IN THE 
SAMPLE/ 
RESPONSE RATE 
 
REFERENCE 
MARKET 
 
BE 
 
Feb. 2004 
 
Banque 
Nationale de 
Belgique 
 
Traditional mail  
 
 
Existing sample of 
the monthly business 
survey of the National 
Bank of Belgium 
 
 
≈ 5600 / 35%  
 
Main market 
 
DE 
 
June-July 
2004 
 
External 
institute (IFO) 
 
Traditional mail 
 
 
Existing sample of 
the IFO monthly 
business survey 
 
 
≈ 2740 / 46% 
 
Domestic 
market 
 
ES 
 
May-Sept. 
2004 
 
External 
company 
 
Traditional mail, 
with prior contact 
by phone.  
Responses by 
mail, phone, fax, 
internet 
 
 
Sample designed by 
Banco de Espana, 
stratified by sector 
and level of 
employment 
 
≈ 3000 / 69% 
 
Main market 
 
FR 
 
Dec. 2003 - 
Feb. 2004 
 
Banque de 
France 
branches 
 
Traditional mail 
with prior contact 
by phone, or 
phone or face to 
face interviews  
 
 
Existing sample of 
the monthly business 
survey of Banque de 
France 
 
≈ 4300 / 38% 
 
Domestic 
market 
 
IT 
 
Feb.-Mar.  
2003 
 
External 
company 
(Poster s.r.l.) 
 
 
Mainly by internet 
with prior contact 
by phone. 
Respondents 
could also return 
the completed 
questionnaire by 
fax 
 
 
Sample drawn from 
the existing sample 
used by the Bank of 
Italy to conduct a 
quarterly survey on 
inflation expectations  
 
 
729 / 46% 
 
 
Main market 
 
LU 
 
 
Aug.-Nov. 
2004 
 
 
Banque 
centrale du 
Luxembourg 
 
Traditional mail 
 
Sample drawn from 
the National 
Statistical Institute 
 
 
≈ 1100 / 30% 
 
Domestic 
market 
 
NL 
 
May 2004 
 
External 
institute  
(TNS-NIPO) 
 
 
Internet 
 
 
Panel of owners, 
higher/top level 
management 
 
 
1870 / 67% 
 
Not specified 
 
AT 
 
Jan.-Feb. 
2004 
 
WIFO (Austrian 
Institute of 
Economic 
Research) 
 
 
Traditional mail 
 
 
Existing sample of 
the Austrian Business 
Cycle Survey 
 
≈ 2.500 / 36% 
 
Main market 
 
PT 
 
May-Sept. 
2004 
 
Banco de 
Portugal 
 
Traditional mail. 
Respondents 
could return the 
completed 
questionnaire on 
paper, by e-mail 
or through a 
website 
 
 
Existing sample from 
the Banco de 
Portugal Central 
Balance-Sheet 
Database 
 
2494 / 55%  
 
Not specified 
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Appendix B – What can be compared across national studies? 
The nine national surveys share a number of common features, which allow a 
meaningful comparison to be made, despite the adoption of a decentralised approach.40 
They all focus on the pricing behaviour with respect to the firm’s main product, which is found 
to account for 60% or more of the turnover of the respondents. In other words, the scope of 
the survey is much broader than it might have been expected from the single or main product 
approach.  
Comparability with respect to sectoral coverage and firm size 
The sectoral coverage, which is shown in Table B.1, varies across the national 
surveys. While some countries cover more or less the entire economy, others are focused 
only on the industrial sector. 
Overall, there appears to be a reasonably solid basis for comparing the industrial and 
the services sectors across countries. In the case of the trade sector, which is covered in five 
country studies, the number of firms surveyed seems to be sufficient to allow a meaningful 
comparison.41 Conversely, the coverage of the construction sector, both in terms of countries 
and numbers of firms included in the various samples, is not sufficient. Results for the total 
sample, industry, trade and other services are presented in the main text, with the aim of 
comparing sectoral patterns; additional sectoral results are presented in Appendix C.  
 
Table B.1 - Sectoral coverage 
(percentages; the number of respondents is given in brackets) 
 
 BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO 
AREA 
(1) 
Industry  38  
(753) 
100 
(1228) 
44 
(888) 
100 
(1662) 
65  
(215) 
20 
(67) 
18  
(219) 
76  
(661) 
84  
(1157) 
62 
(6850) 
Trade  24  
(478) 
- 26 
(515) 
- 14  
(46) 
22 
(73) 
22  
(271) 
- - 13 
(1383) 
Other services 18  
(364) 
- 30 
(605) 
- 20  
(68) 
37 
(125) 
60  
(756) 
24  
(212) 
16  
(213) 
21  
(2343) 
Construction 20  
(384) 
- - - 1  
(4) 
22 
(74) 
  - 4 
(462) 
Total 100 
(1979)
100 
(1228) 
100 
(2008)
100 
(1662) 
100 
(333) 
100 
(339) 
100 
(1246) 
100 
(873) 
100 
(1370) 
100 
(11038)
 
Note:   (1) Percentages for the euro area are computed on the basis of the absolute figures reported in 
brackets, which are the sum of the firms in each category over the nine countries. 
 
 
                                                
40  Clearly though, the survey characteristics (when and by whom the survey was conducted, the survey method 
and the sample design) may have an impact on the results, which is difficult to quantify. The same applies to 
the different weighting procedures adopted by the NCBs and to the fact that the surveys where conducted in 
different languages. 
41  The industrial sector covers Sections D and E of the NACE Rev. 1 classification (manufacturing; electricity, 
gas and water supply), while trade covers Section G (retail and wholesale trade) and services other than trade 
covers Sections H, I and K (hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication; real estate, renting 
and business activities). 
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 Table B.2 – Firm size, based on the number of employees 
(percentages) 
 
 BE DE ES FR IT LU NL (1) AT PT EURO 
AREA (2) 
1-49  75  29 42 18 - 46 81 53 39  47 
50-199  17 35 23 43 39 43 19  28 38 29 
>=200 8  36 35 39 61  11 - 19  23  24 
 
Notes:   (1) In the Netherlands, the size classes are defined as follows: 1-49; ≥50. 
(2) Percentages for the euro area are computed on the basis of absolute figures, which are the 
sum of the firms in each category over the nine countries (not reported in the Table). 
 
 
The national surveys cover firms of different sizes in terms of numbers of employees 
(Table B.2). Since it can be assumed that a firm’s size matters from the point of view 
of pricing behaviour, not only because of the generally different environment in which 
large and small firms operate, the differences in size structures of the various samples 
should be taken into account when comparing results across countries. In order to 
explore these differences, results are given for the following size classes: 1-49 employees, 
50-199 employees, 200 employees and above. 
Main characteristics of the market in which the firm operates 
The environment and the structure of the market are crucial determinants for a firm’s 
pricing behaviour. It is therefore important to establish whether a firm operates on the 
domestic or on the foreign market, whether its relationships are mainly with other firms or 
with consumers and whether these relationships are long-standing or occasional in nature. 
Moreover, the degree of market competition is a key factor in the pricing strategy of a firm. 
The national surveys ask very similar questions on the above-mentioned 
characteristics, with some qualifications. In particular, the questionnaires differ with respect 
to the reference market, i.e. some country questionnaires ask about pricing in the domestic 
market (DE, FR, LU) and others about pricing in the main market (BE, ES, IT, AT), while in 
the remaining questionnaires the market is not specified.42 To infer reliable results for the 
euro area, it is important that the responses of the majority of firms refer to the domestic 
(national) market or at least to the euro area. The top part of Table B.3 shows that, for all 
countries, this is indeed the case for the industrial sector.43 The openness of individual euro 
area countries is reflected by the fact that around 30% of the respondents have a foreign 
market as the main market for their main product and that in many cases this market is a 
euro area country.  
The fact that the majority of the companies (75% on average) sell their main 
product predominantly to other firms (Table B.3, item 2) is a reflection of the dominance of 
the industrial sector in the national samples. Therefore, survey results refer mostly to the 
behaviour of producer prices rather than to consumer prices. 
 
                                                
42  See Appendix A. 
43  This is even more evident in the services sector, which is not included in the item 1 in Table B.3. 
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 Table B.3 – Market structure 
 (percentages) (1) 
 
 BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO 
AREA (2)
1. Main market for the main product            
Industry (3)           
- domestic 55 78 85 64 73 58 72 69 67 73 
- foreign 45 22 15 36 27 42 28 31 33 27 
2. Main customer            
- other firms 56 89 58 66 73 - - 84 84 75 
- consumers 40 7 39 30 25 - - 9 13 21 
- public sector 4 4 3 4 2 - - 7 3 3 
3. Firm-customer relationships (4)           
- long term 78 57 86 54 98 85 - 81 83 70 
- occasional 22 43 14 46 2 15 - 19 17 30 
4. Perceived competition (5)           
- very low 18 19 27 19 10 15 5 20 8 17 
- low  22 23 19 17 25 17 25 18 21 21 
- high 30 34 24 38 37 37 49 30 39 35 
- very high 30 24 30 25 29 31 22 32 32 26 
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2) Weighted averages (GDP weights).   (3) Only the 
information under item 1 of the table refers to the industrial sector; the other three items refer to the whole sample 
in each national survey.   (4) In the case of Belgium, France and Italy, this refers to relationships with other firms. 
(5) Measured by the importance a firm attaches to competitors´ prices when considering reducing its own prices.  
 
Most of the companies (an average of 70% in the euro area) have a long-term 
relationship with their customers (Table B.3, item 3), which may act as a kind of “implicit” 
contract. In the case of Italy the share is particularly high, as it refers to companies that have 
long-term relationships with other companies.44 
Item 4 of Table B.3 shows how respondents perceive the degree of competition they 
face on their main market, proxied by the importance they attribute to competitors’ prices in 
influencing a reduction in their own prices (unimportant, of minor importance, important, 
very important). Although the majority of the firms perceive that competition is high or very 
high, the share of those operating in an environment of weak competition (very low and low) 
is on average just below 40%. It is worth remarking that the national surveys also ask firms 
to report information on other measures of market competition, such as the number of 
competitors in their main market or their market share. However, as these proxies provide in 
some cases diverging information on the degree of competition, we stick to the “direct” 
evidence on how firms judge the severeness of their competitive environment. 
All in all, the evidence on market characteristics provided by the surveys shows 
that firms in the euro area operate in a monopolistically competitive environment and that 
relationships with customers are important and of a long-standing nature. 
                                                
44  The share is lower for firms’ relationships with consumers. 
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 Appendix C – Sectoral results 
 
Table C.1 - Price setting rules  
(percentages) (1) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT NL PT(3) EURO AREA(4)
(weight%) 3.7 29.8 9.8 21.6 17.8 6.3 1.8
total const. var.(2) total const. var. total const. var.
Markup 0
goods 49 14 35 73 4 69 55 40 48 63 28 34 67 56
trade 41 11 30 - - - 50 - 16 71 37 34 - 37
services 49 18 31 - - - 50 - 43 45 19 26 48 46
Competitors' price 0
goods 40 17 24 38 33 19 13 27
trade 33 - 26 - 35 21 - 30
services 39 - 31 - 18 24 8 24
Other 0
goods 11 10 22 22 19 18 19 17
trade 26 - 23 - 49 8 - 33
services 11.9 - 20 - 40 31 44 31
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2) Firms adopting a mark-up price setting rule and responding 
"important" or "very important" to a least one of the theories concerning counter-cyclical mark-ups.   (3) In the case of 
Portugal the issue was not addressed directly; the information reported in the table has been estimated on the basis 
of the answers to other questions.   (4) GDP weights. 
 
 
 
Table C.2 – Information set for pricing decisions 
(percentages) 
 
BE ES IT LU AT PT EURO AREA (1)
Goods
Rule of thumb 29 29 - 28 - 20
Past/Present context 27 42 31 18 33 32 34
Present/Future context 45 29 69 54 13 48 50
Past, present and future - - - - 55 -
Trade
Rule of thumb 35 33 - 21 - -
Past/Present context 35 49 33 28 - - 38
Present/Future context 30 18 67 51 - - 47
Past, present and future
Services
Rule of thumb 46 37 - 40 - 42
Past/Present context 23 30 29 25 35 21 29
Present/Future context 31 33 71 35 13 38 55
Past, present and future - - - - 53 -  
 
Note:   (1) Weighted average (GDP weights). 
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Table C.3 - Frequency of price reviews per year 
(percentages) (1) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (2)
Goods
>= 12 7 30 5 31 30 11 39 35 20 26
4 – 11 12 19 6 22 15 21 19 29 15 16
<=3 81 51 90 47 55 68 42 37 65 58
median 1 - 1 4 - 2 4 4 2
Trade
>= 12 2 - 17 - 32 44 56 - - 29
4 – 11 4 - 12 - 19 11 16 - - 15
<=3 94 - 72 - 49 44 28 - - 56
median 1 - 1 - - 4 12 - -
Services
>= 12 3 - 2 - 20 13 24 24 9 15
4 – 11 5 - 6 - 11 21 21 22 6 11
<=3 92 - 92 - 70 67 55 53 85 74
median 1 - 1 - - 2 1 2 2  
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2) Weighted averages (GDP weights). 
 
 
 
Table C.4 - Frequency of price changes per year 
(percentages) (1) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (2)
Goods
>= 4 14 21 11 9 13 12 5 11 13 15
2– 3 15 21 10 24 18 22 18 22 17 18
1 51 14 59 46 51 45 67 60 48 39
0 20 44 20 21 19 22 10 8 23 28
median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Trade
>= 4 6 - 28 - 5 43 20 - - 14
2– 3 27 - 20 - 41 27 28 - - 32
1 53 - 43 - 40 22 45 - - 43
0 14 - 9 - 15 8 7 - - 12
median 1 - 1 - 1 2 1 - -
Services
>= 4 4 - 7 - 5 16 6 10 6 6
2– 3 7 - 18 - 5 27 14 11 5 10
1 64 - 64 - 57 36 67 44 70 60
0 25 - 11 - 33 22 13 35 19 24
median 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1  
 
Notes:   (1) Re-scaled figures excluding non-responses.   (2) Weighted averages (GDP 
weights). 
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 Table C.5 - Ranking of theories explaining price stickiness 
(mean scores) 
 
BE DE ES FR IT LU NL AT PT EURO AREA (1)
Goods
Implicit contracts 2.7 - 2.5 2.2 - 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.2 2.7
Explicit contracts 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.6
Cost-based pricing 2.4 2.2 - 2.5 - 2.7 - 2.7 2.7 2.5
Co-ordination failure 2.4 - 2.4 3.0 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.9 2.5
Temporary shocks 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.5 1.6 2.5 2.0
Judging price by quality 1.9 - 1.7 - - 1.8 2.4 1.8 2.3 2.0
Change non-price factors 2.0 - 1.4 - - 1.9 2.1 1.6 - 1.8
Menu costs 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.5
Costly information 1.7 - 1.3 - - 1.7 - 1.7 1.7 1.6
Pricing thresholds 1.5 - 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.8 1.5
Trade
Implicit contracts 2.4 - 2.6 - - 2.4 2.6 - - 2.5
Explicit contracts 1.8 - 1.9 - 1.9 2.3 2.3 - - 2.1
Cost-based pricing 2.5 - - - - 2.3 - - - 2.4
Co-ordination failure 2.2 - 2.6 - 2.7 2.4 2.3 - - 2.4
Temporary shocks 1.8 - 1.8 - 2.1 1.7 2.4 - - 2.0
Judging price by quality 2.1 - 1.8 - - 2.1 2.4 - - 2.1
Change non-price factors 1.7 - 1.3 - - 1.8 2.0 - - 1.7
Menu costs 1.7 - 1.6 - 1.8 1.7 1.9 - - 1.7
Costly information 1.6 - 1.4 - - 1.7 - - - 1.6
Pricing thresholds 2.1 - 1.7 - 2.0 2.0 2.1 - - 2.0
Services
Implicit contracts 2.7 - 2.6 - - 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.8
Explicit contracts 2.7 - 2.6 - 3.0 2.8 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.8
Cost-based pricing 2.5 - - - - 2.8 - 2.5 2.7 2.6
Co-ordination failure 2.0 - 2.4 - 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.2
Temporary shocks 1.7 - 1.8 - 1.9 1.7 2.3 1.5 2.2 1.9
Judging price by quality 2.0 - 2.0 - - 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.2 2.1
Change non-price factors 1.6 - 1.3 - - 1.7 1.9 1.8 - 1.7
Menu costs 1.4 - 1.4 - 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.6
Costly information 1.6 - 1.3 - - 1.8 - 1.6 1.7 1.6
Pricing thresholds 1.6 - 1.6 - 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.9 1.6  
 
Note:   (1) Unweighted average of countries’ scores. 
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Figure C.1 – Price-raising factors in the euro area 
(average scores) (1) 
 
1
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3
4
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costs
productivity demand competitors
1-49 workers 50-199 workers >199 workers goods trade other services
 
Note:   (1) Unweighted averages of countries’ scores. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2 - Price-reducing factors in the euro area 
(average scores) (1) 
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Note:   (1) Unweighted averages of countries’ scores. 
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